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Do elected councils improve governance experimental evidence on local institutions in Afghanistan (Inglês)

Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves. However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to either the council or customary leaders, the creation of elected councils increases embezzlement and makes decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage the distribution jointly with customary leaders also increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking.

Detalhes

  • Autor

    Beath,Andrew, Christia,Fotini, Enikolopov,Ruben

  • Data do documento

    2013/06/01

  • TIpo de documento

    Documento de trabalho sobre pesquisa de políticas

  • No. do relatório

    WPS6510

  • Nº do volume

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • País

    Afeganistão,

  • Região

    Sul da Ásia,

  • Data de divulgação

    2013/06/01

  • Disclosure Status

    Disclosed

  • Nome do documento

    Do elected councils improve governance ? experimental evidence on local institutions in Afghanistan

  • Palavras-chave

    male head of household;Massachusetts Institute of Technology;food aid distribution;world food programme;quality of governance;local public good;assignment of responsibility;average treatment effect;Check and Balances;number of women;measures of assets;number of violations;degrees of participation;local governance institution;Public Sector Governance;data collection activity;terms of aid;impact of democratization;incidence conflict;road and bridges;standard public service;structure of governance;participation of woman;public goods provision;level of compliance;drinking water facility;effect of governance;common pool problem;rehabilitation of infrastructure;access of woman;human capital development;female participation;random sample;village leadership;wheat;council management;vulnerable household;standard deviation;block grant;vulnerable group;survey respondent;aid target;recipient household;individual indicator;needy household;political institution;vulnerable population;governance outcome;food distribution;private benefit;qualitative study;household survey;intended beneficiary;local elite;Aid Delivery;universal suffrage;economic welfare;standard error;aid recipient;female respondent;treatment group;field experiment;women participation;rural population;positive impact;governance quality;institutional change;quantitative data;substantial variation;village elder;econometric specification;Economic Inequality;negative effect;quantitative research;public resource;geographic variable;village survey;baseline survey;geographic spread;logistical problems;intervention measure;village council;land holding;food preparation;direct transfer;traditional leaders;hypothesis testing;fixed effect;variance-covariance matrix;political authority;working age;electoral accountability;subjective assessment;deceased husband;democratic election;marginalized group;independent contractor;social indicator;open access;empirical investigation;Governance Services;local interest;causal effect;local council;empirical evidence;development policy;study design;behavioral incentives;local market;telecommunication infrastructure;accountability structure;vulnerable communities;food assistance;humanitarian agency;food shortage;village cluster;food need;road condition;accessible location;cross-country evidence;research design;democratic institution;electrical generator;increased redistribution;improved public;governance responsibility;irrigation canal;literacy course;moral issues;village communities;representative institutions;high wage;rural rehabilitation;rural area;unannounced visit;local bodies;quantitative comparison;principal component;measure of use;socioeconomic data;

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