This paper studies a dynamic game where each of two large blocs, of fossil fuel importers and exporters respectively, sets either taxes or quotas to exercise power in fossil-fuel markets. The main novel feature is the inclusion of a "fringe" of non- strategic (emerging and developing) countries which both consume and produce fossil fuels. Cumulated emissions over time from global fossil fuel consumption create climate damages which are considered...
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DETALHES
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2013/10/01
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Documento de trabalho sobre pesquisa de políticas
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WPS6679
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1
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1
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2013/10/01
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Disclosed
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Dynamic climate policy with both strategic and non-strategic agents : taxes versus quantities
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Abatement
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