This paper uses new data on agricultural policy interventions to examine the political economy of agricultural trade policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Historically, African governments have discriminated against agricultural producers in general (relative to producers in non-agricultural sectors), and against producers of export agriculture in particular. While more moderate in recent years, these patterns of discrimination persist. They do so even though farmers comprise a political majority. Rather than claiming the existence of a single best approach to the analysis of policy choice, the authors explore the impact of three factors: institutions, regional inequality, and tax revenue-generation. The authors find that agricultural taxation increases with the rural population share in the absence of electoral party competition; yet, the existence of party competition turns the lobbying disadvantage of the rural majority into political advantage. The authors also find that privileged cash crop regions are particular targets for redistributive taxation, unless the country's president comes from that region. In addition, governments of resource-rich countries, while continuing to tax export producers, reduce their taxation of food consumers.
Detalhes
-
Autor
-
Data do documento
2009/05/01
-
No. do relatório
55960
-
Nº do volume
1
-
Total Volume(s)
1
-
País
-
Região
-
Data de divulgação
2010/08/05
-
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
-
Nome do documento
Political economy of agricultural trade interventions in Africa
-
Palavras-chave
rural population;cash crop;Agriculture;food crop;historical pattern;nominal rate;electoral competition;agricultural distortions;production of cash crop;dynamic panel data model;increase in consumer income;political economy of development;alternative source of revenue;party competition;per capita income;random effects model;resource rich countries;Support for Agriculture;income of farmers;urban agricultural policy;income on food;nominal exchange rate;random effects estimator;interests of consumer;agricultural trade policy;allocation of power;modern economic growth;comparative political economy;calculation of rate;incentive for farmer;rural population change;cash crop production;domestic price;arable land;regional inequality;landlocked country;standard error;political institution;
- Exibir mais
Downloads
COMPLETAR RELATÓRIO
Versão oficial do documento (pode conter assinaturas, etc.)
- PDF oficial
- TXT*
- Total Downloads** :
- Download Stats
-
*A versão do texto é um OCR incorreto e está incluído unicamente em benefício de usuários com conectividade lenta.