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Delivering project aid in old and new ways : institutions matter (Inglês)

An "output-based approach" to aid (OBA) is a term to describe the practice whereby donors or governments delegate service delivery to private third parties (firms or nonprofits) under contracts that tie donor or government payments to the particular outputs. This paper is intended to provide a background for the discussion of donor-financed OBA. It will do this by sketching the broader context of aid reform and public-sector management that OBA fits into and by doing this, in part, using an explicit contracting framework. The first part of the paper will look at the changing fortunes of OBA in the recent period. The IBA project vehicle has both evolved and been partially substituted by other aid vehicles in response to changing politics, changing perceptions of the development challenge and process, and changing techniques of public management. The second part of the paper provides a relevant contracting framework by postulating what makes contracts work, how the attributes of governments constrain them in contracting, but how new models (including OBA) have emerged to get around these constraints. In the third part, the author looks at the contracting attributes of donor agencies and recipient governments and the available evidence about how contracts have worked in aid projects. Finally, the paper sums up the implications of the public-sector and aid contracting experience for donor-recipient OBA. OBA clearly promises to improve the aid contract. But of itself, OBA does not strengthen the donor's commitment to project implementation. Nor can donors afford to ignore the role of the government in making OBA work.

Detalhes

  • Autor

    Shepherd, Geoffrey

  • Data do documento

    2002/05/27

  • TIpo de documento

    Documento de Trabalho

  • No. do relatório

    37556

  • Nº do volume

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • País

    Mundo,

  • Região

    Regiões Mundiais,

  • Data de divulgação

    2006/09/28

  • Disclosure Status

    Disclosed

  • Nome do documento

    Delivering project aid in old and new ways : institutions matter

  • Palavras-chave

    Operational Policy and Country Services;structural adjustment lending;access to capital market;private participation in health;governments in transition economies;types of contract;bureaucrats in business;multinational development bank;regional development bank;private entity;donor agencies;access to information;provision of service;physical capital accumulation;real exchange rate;international capital market;quality of public;word of mouth;rate of failure;Public Expenditure Management;framework for development;structural adjustment loan;good policy outcome;effectiveness of loans;Check and Balances;debt service obligation;payment by result;incentives for performance;government's reform program;success and failure;control over resources;share in profit;cost of production;performance contract;private good;private interest;research study;Public Services;competitive market;credible commitment;aid community;private parties;private party;regulatory contract;private managers;bureaucratic politics;administrative cost;investment lending;interest group;contract work;Donor countries;contractual framework;financial pressure;positive impact;efficiency gain;employment policy;contractual arrangement;advanced country;Public Goods;traditional investment;weighting system;political costs;financial resource;small sample;Contracting Out;transactions cost;adjustment program;internal auditor;public asset;supply contract;financial flow;mutual obligation;program lending;democratic accountability;Success Fee;Employment Policies;contractual condition;government guarantee;government contract;benchmark pricing;government interference;risk premium;satisfactory rating;public scrutiny;subjective judgment;public criticism;staff turnover;good performance;residual rights;perceived likelihood;employee motivation;macroeconomic level;evaluation study;internal evaluation;Political Economy;debt forgiveness;political science;IDA countries;Career Compensation;contractual incentive;developmental impact;policy variable;government objective;budget resource;political change;reality check;financial inflow;political priority;Economic Policy;program objectives;Provide Aid;economic crisis;local ownership;aid agency;literature review;aid effectiveness;running cost;privileged status;financial market;organizational change;project lending;loan repayment;loan appraisal;long life;government management;contractual relationship;program budget;program outcome;perverse incentives;loan volume;government incentive;multinational corporation;private management;support policy;personnel policy;pay contract;natural monopolies;telecom sector;political scientist;project failure;Conflict Resolution;infrastructure contract;government service;refuse collection;organizational incentives;fire protection;government support;cost structure;organization theory;governance arrangement;managerial autonomy;asymmetric information;payment schedule;reputation mechanisms;inferior product;performance rating;arbitration body;price instability;regulatory regime;production process;political regime;price stability;Labor Market;public body;voucher scheme;foreign donor;wage policy;efficient production;accrual accounting;debt crisis;policy problems;richer countries;mutual commitment;environmental concern;finance objective;property right;potential competition;academic tradition;Social Sciences;incentive structure;principal-agent theory;working relationship;monopoly profit;special interest;financial sustainability;civil society;educational service;contract structure;smaller number;managerial methods;performance orientation;accountability relationship;legal compliance;bureaucratic demands;Aid Delivery;aggregate result;governance failures;sector work;ceteris paribus;direct competition;institutional condition;local knowledge;public choice;client input;project indicator;political agenda;donor effort;market orientation;commercial interests;loan approval;independent assessment;operational staff;representative sample

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