Telecommunications Reform -privatization and opening markets to competition- can be a positive-sum game in which all stakeholders gain: customers, existing and new operators, employees, domestic and foreign investors, and government. But the extent and timing of benefits vary from one case to another. The author sets out some rules for reform that will enhance those benefits: Get support at the highest level of political authority. Sort out conflicting objectives early especially the conflict between maximizing revenue and delivering more, better, and cheaper services. Use market mechanisms rather than individual negotiations to select the partners and determine the right sale price. Establish and follow clearly defined processes for sale and regulation that are open to participation and review by all interested parties. And respect and trust the general public and keep it informed. Although major transactions such as a privatization or the issuance of new licenses drive the reform agenda, change continues well beyond them. Following the rules and honoring commitments help consolidate an environment for sustainable development of telecommunications.
Detalhes
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Autor
Wellenious, Bjorn
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Data do documento
1997/10/31
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TIpo de documento
Ponto de vista
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No. do relatório
17222
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Nº do volume
1
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Total Volume(s)
1
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País
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Região
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Data de divulgação
2018/01/02
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Disclosure Status
Disclosed
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Nome do documento
Telecommunications reform - how to succeed
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Palavras-chave
Privatization;effective transfer of control;infrastructure network;contract of sale;Emerging economies;emerging economy;market to competition;telecommunications and postal;increase tax revenue;award of licenses;cost to consumer;employee stock option;proceeds from privatization;chamber of commerce;regulatory capability;high tariff;state telecommunication;state monopoly;competitive market;cellular license;regulatory decision;sale strategy;rural area;law;debt finance;global market;public administrator;price reform;interest group;operator license;low-income population;regulatory risk;Labor Union;interconnection terms;foreign exchange;persistent gaps;commercial objectives;primary purpose;labor problem;expected growth;political clout;regulatory intervention;government obligation;investor risk;public offering;open market;interconnection obligations;license fee;government share;economic efficiency;strategic investor;process capability;interconnection agreement;transmission facility;market mechanism;sale price;existing tariffs;efficient price;budget deficit;financial adviser;Success Fee;transaction price;political authority;red tape;consumer price;foreign investor;tariff structure;clear rules;regulatory function;regulatory authority;cost elements;telephone line;liberal entry;regulatory uncertainty;competition policy;local investor;partial privatization;telecommunications company;large enterprise;financial consumer;state enterprises;government revenue;pricing policy;government subsidy;career prospect;competitive bidding;basic telephone;rural population;debt service;telecommunications law;labor productivity;government exchange;
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