The effect of troop withdrawal on extortion : decentralized corruption on trucking routes in Aceh (English)

Extortion by police and military personnel manning roadside security posts has been a consistent problem in each of Indonesia's areas of large-scale conflict. The staged withdrawal of security forces from Aceh following the 2005 Helsinki peace accord ...  See More + Extortion by police and military personnel manning roadside security posts has been a consistent problem in each of Indonesia's areas of large-scale conflict. The staged withdrawal of security forces from Aceh following the 2005 Helsinki peace accord presented an opportunity to observe the effect of a reduction in the number of security posts on the overall cost of illegal payments for trucks to transport goods. A Conflict and Development (C&D) program study found that troop withdrawals during the first six months after the peace agreement led to a decrease in extortion, but that illegal payments decreased by a smaller proportion than did the number of security posts. An 80 percent reduction in the number of posts during the period of the study produced only a 51 percent reduction in the amount of bribes paid at posts. When troops were withdrawn, changing the structure of the corruption market, the remaining posts each adjusted their prices upwards, but not by enough to offset the effect on the overall level of illegal payments caused by the reduction in posts. Had the amount of illegal payments extracted by the posts been set centrally, for instance by a provincial commander, prices will have been expected to be raised sufficiently at each post to keep the overall level of illegal payments constant. There are two implications for the Government of Indonesia's ongoing commitment to combat corruption and for anti-corruption efforts elsewhere. First, it suggests that in many cases, a simple policy of reducing the number of roadside security posts on a road may lead to less corruption. Second, the case illustrates that tackling corruption by targeting the top level of an organization could actually lead to higher bribes being charged, if doing so causes a centralized scheme of bribe setting to become decentralized.  See Less -

Document also available in : Bahasa (Indonesian)