Democracy, credibility and clientelism (English)

The authors demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they can build reputations. This requires that they fulfill preconditions that in practice are costly: informing voters of their promises; tracking those promises;...

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Author

Keefer,Philip E.;

Vlaicu,Razvan;
Document Date
2005/01/01
Document Type
Policy Research Working Paper
Report Number
WPS3472
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Country
World,
Region
Other,
Disclosure Date
2010/07/01
Doc Name
Democracy, credibility and clientelism
Keywords
public good provision

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Citation

Keefer,Philip E.; Vlaicu,Razvan.

Democracy, credibility and clientelism (English). Policy, Research working paper ; no. WPS 3472 Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/560421468762575480

Democracy, credibility and clientelism (English)

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