The authors demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they can build reputations. This requires that they fulfill preconditions that in practice are costly: informing voters of their promises; tracking those promises;...
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DETALHES
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2005/01/01
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Documento de trabalho sobre pesquisa de políticas
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WPS3472
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1
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1
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2010/07/01
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Democracy, credibility and clientelism
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public good provision
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