Quantitative (trade) restrictions cost the United States three times what the protection-equivalent tariff would cost--because two-thirds of the higher cost to consumers goes straight to foreign producers. Why the giveaway to foreigners? United states producers have a louder voice than US consumers, and foreing producers lobby aggressively to face a quaota rather than a tariff--and thus get a higher price in the US market.
Details
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Document Date
1992/10/31
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Document Type
Brief
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Report Number
21630
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Volume No
1
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Total Volume(s)
1
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Country
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Region
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Disclosure Date
2001/03/09
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Disclosure Status
Disclosed
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Doc Name
The high costs of U.S. quantitative restrictions
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Keywords
quantitative restriction;economies of scale;nontariff barrier;multilateral tariff negotiation;average tariff rate;barriers to trade;multilateral trade negotiation;unfair foreign trade;Labor Union;freer trade;Trade Policies;Trade Policy;foreign producer;tariff reduction;tariff structure;manufactured goods;displaced worker;foreign exporter;Steel;perfect competition;development policy;earnings loss;Industrial Policies;nontariff trade;individual bank;Industrial Policy;welfare gains;oligopolistic structure;Labor Market;world war;world trade;bilateral deals;steel industry;union activity;uruguay round;real wage;election campaign;trade restriction;wage structure;trading system;high wage;tariff protection;relative magnitude;
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Citation
The high costs of U.S. quantitative restrictions (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/613611468317997231/The-high-costs-of-U-S-quantitative-restrictions